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                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal requires us to revisit the doctrine of 
absolute and qualified immunity in order to determine if we may 
review at this time the district court's order which denied 
summary judgment to the individual defendants.  Insofar as the 
appellee Giuffre's complaint alleges violations of his Fifth, 
Sixth, and procedural Fourteenth Amendment rights, we hold that 
the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and 
to that extent reverse the district court's order.  We also hold 
that the district court correctly denied absolute immunity at 
this time for Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell. 
Without expressing any views as to the merits of Giuffre's 
remaining claims, we dismiss the balance of the appeal for lack 
of appellate jurisdiction.   
 
I. 
 The appellants, Prosecutor Bissell and five of his 
current and former investigative officers (collectively, "the 
appellant officials"), and the County of Somerset ("the County"), 
appeal the district court's order denying  their motion for 
summary judgment, which was brought against the appellee, James 
J. Giuffre.  
 Giuffre's claims against the County and the appellant 
officials arose from Giuffre's arrest on May 10, 1990 following 
an official investigation by the Somerset County Prosecutor's 
Office and other investigative authorities of an alleged drug 
conspiracy.  Within 24 hours of his arrest, and without 
representation by counsel, Giuffre conveyed ownership to the 
County of two building lots he owned in neighboring Hunterdon 
County.  That transaction was ostensibly authorized under the 
forfeiture provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-10 because Giuffre signed 
a written statement admitting that the two building lots were 
purchased in part with illegal drug proceeds.  The forfeited 
building lots were sold seven months later at public auction, and 
the drug charges against Giuffre were administratively dismissed 
by the Prosecutor's Office on October 31, 1991, after Giuffre 
cooperated in an ongoing drug investigation.  Although the 
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  N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1, in relevant part, provides: 
 
a.  Any interest in the following shall be subject 
to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in 
them: 
 
(1)  Controlled dangerous substances . . ..  shall 
be designated prima facie contraband. 
* * * 
(4) Proceeds of illegal activities, including, but 
not limited to, property or money obtained as a 
result of the sale of prima facie contraband as 
defined by subsection a.(1) . . ..  
statute of limitations at this juncture has yet to run, Giuffre 
still has not been indicted.0  
 On May 7, 1992, Giuffre filed the instant action, 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the County and 
against the appellant officials, both in their official and 
individual capacities, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
United States Constitution, and New Jersey law.0  In his 
                     
0At oral argument, all counsel admitted that, despite the virtual 
conclusive proof that Giuffre was involved in drug distribution, 
Giuffre had not been indicted.  Counsel for Giuffre readily 
acknowledged that there was "never any question" that Giuffre had 
cocaine in his house at the time of his arrest. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 30.  The suggestion was voiced by the attorney 
for the County and appellant officials that, although the 
criminal case against Giuffre was "air-tight," the County 
Prosecutor's Office "felt that it would look like vindictive 
prosecution" if it indicted Giuffre after he commenced this civil 
action.  Id. at 21-23.  The County thus made a "strategical 
decision at the beginning of [this civil] case" not to indict 
Giuffre so as to avoid any "inconsisten[cy in] establishing 
during the trial that there was, in fact, a deal that is 
enforceable."  Id. at 22.   
 
0
  The eight-count complaint names as defendants:  Somerset 
County Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell; the Prosecutor's chief of 
detectives, Richard Thornburg; deputy chief of detectives, Robert 
Smith, Sergeant Richard Meyers and Detective Samuel DeBella of 
the Prosecutor's Office; and Warren Township police detective 
Russell W. Leffert, who was working with the Prosecutor's 
investigators. 
      Counts 1 and 2 of Giuffre's complaint allege that the 
appellant officials conspired to deprive Giuffre and actually 
deprived Giuffre of his constitutional and civil rights in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.  Count 3 alleges that 
the officials conspired to violate Giuffre's rights under the 
United States Constitution.  Count 4 alleges that the County had 
a de facto policy of targeting for criminal investigation and 
prosecution individuals who owned substantial assets, and of 
obtaining those assets through fraud and duress, and in violation 
of their constitutional and civil rights, and that that alleged 
policy was maintained and implemented by Prosecutor Bissell, 
Chief Thornburg, and other members of the Prosecutor's staff. 
Count 5 asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986 by 
complaint against the County and the officials, Giuffre also 
sought judgment rescinding the sale of his forfeited lots, and a 
declaratory judgment that the officials conspired to violate 
and/or violated his constitutional and civil rights, and 
conspired to deprive him of his property through fraud, duress 
and without due process of law.   
 The County and the officials moved for summary 
judgment, arguing, among other things, that the individual 
officials were entitled to qualified and/or absolute immunity. 
Their summary judgment motion was supported by the depositions of 
the appellant officials and other witnesses who denied the 
allegations in Giuffre's complaint.  In opposition to summary 
judgment, Giuffre presented his own deposition evidence, which 
created a dispute of fact over the circumstances under which he 
conveyed title to his two building lots.  After considering the 
parties' arguments and conflicting evidence, the district court 
on July 29, 1993 denied the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment.   
 The district court determined that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because Giuffre's deposition testimony raised 
genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) the appellant 
officials' allegedly coercive and unconstitutional conduct toward 
Giuffre; (2) the existence of an alleged civil rights conspiracy; 
                                                                  
virtue of the alleged failure of Bissell and Thornburg to train 
and supervise properly their subordinates.   
       In Counts 5, 6, and 7, Giuffre asserts claims against the 
officials for alleged violations of New Jersey law.  
 
(3) the existence and effects of the County's alleged policy of 
targeting criminal defendants who owned substantial assets, and 
(4) the alleged failure of the County to train and supervise 
properly the appellant officials.  The district court did not 
discuss at length the immunity defenses raised by the individual 
officials.  The court ruled that Prosecutor Bissell was not 
entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because Bissell's 
actions could be characterized as investigatory.  It also ruled 
that none of the individual officials was entitled to qualified 
immunity because Giuffre had raised a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether any clearly established laws had been violated 
by the officials.  
 On appeal, the County and the officials contend, as 
they did before the district court, that they were entitled to 
summary judgment because:  (1) Giuffre has failed to state a 
viable cause of action under § 1983 for violations of his rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution; (2) the officials lacked the requisite 
personal involvement and specific conduct to be held liable under 
§ 1983 for federal constitutional violations or under the New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act for state law violations; (3) the 
individual officers are shielded, in any event, from suit on 
Giuffre's federal and pendent state claims under principles of 
absolute and/or qualified immunity; and (4) there is insufficient 
evidence to hold the County liable under any of the legal 
theories stated by Giuffre.  
 We will affirm that portion of the July 29, 1993 order 
of the district court denying Prosecutor Bissell absolute 
immunity, and we will reverse that order only to the extent that 
it denies the officials qualified immunity for alleged violations 
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the procedural due process 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We will dismiss the 
balance of this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
II. 
 The County and the appellant officials urge us to 
reverse the district court's denial of their motion for summary 
judgment.  Generally, we ordinarily have no jurisdiction to 
review orders denying summary judgment because such orders are 
not final within the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  W.D.D., 
Inc. v. Thornbury Township, 850 F.2d 170, 171 (3d Cir.) (in 
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988).   
 The Supreme Court has held, however, that an order 
denying qualified or absolute immunity, to the extent that the 
order turns on an issue of law, is immediately appealable under 
the collateral order doctrine.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 530 (1985).  That is because the immunity doctrine does not 
serve merely as a public official's defense to liability; rather 
it shelters that official from having to stand trial.  This 
immunity from suit is lost when a case is erroneously permitted 
to go to trial.  Id. at 526-27; Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 
1097, 1105 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991). We 
thus have appellate jurisdiction to consider the immunity issues 
raised by the individual officials. 
 
A. 
 Up to this point, Giuffre's claims for declaratory 
judgment and for judgment rescinding the forfeiture of his lots 
have not been ruled upon.  In addition, the district court has 
refused to certify as final its order denying summary judgment on 
Giuffre's claims for money damages, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1292(b).0   Giuffre's damage claims, however, are joined in his 
complaint with an ostensible claim for prospective injunctive 
relief.  We have held in Prisco v. United States Dep't of 
Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. 
Smith v. Prisco, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989), that the inclusion of a 
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  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides: 
 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action 
an order not otherwise appealable under this 
section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation, he shall so state 
in writing in such order.  The Court of Appeals 
which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such 
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an 
appeal to be taken from such order, if application 
is made to it within ten days after the entry of 
the order:  Provided, however, That application 
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings 
in the district court unless the district judge or 
the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so 
order.  
viable claim for prospective equitable relief bars interlocutory 
review of a district court's denial of immunity.  
 Our Prisco opinion explained why the Mitchell 
collateral order doctrine is not available for a joinder of 
claims for injunctive relief and money damages:  
The marginal benefit to a governmental official from an 
interlocutory review of a ruling that proof of damages 
should not be heard is so slight that it cannot 
outweigh the systemic harms from permitting piecemeal 
interlocutory review of discrete issues in a case 
which, even against that official, will be ongoing. 
 
Id. at 96.  Although we alone among the courts of appeals adhere 
to such a rule, we nevertheless are bound to follow Prisco in 
those cases where a plaintiff states a colorable claim for 
injunctive relief in addition to a claim for damages.  See, e.g., 
Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert denied sub nom. Roberts v. Mutsko, 113 S. Ct. 1049 (1993); 
see also Internal Operating Procedures, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Rule 9.1 ("The holding of a panel 
in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels . . . . in 
banc consideration is required [to overrule such a holding].").  
 Proper application of the Prisco rule requires an 
initial determination of whether a claim for injunctive relief 
is, on its face, colorable.  Acierno v. Cloutier,     F.3d    , 
1994 WL 318783 * 8 (slip op. at 21) (3d Cir. July 7, 1994) 
("Prisco allows us to 'examine[] the complaint carefully to 
determine whether any of its allegations would permit proof of 
facts warranting any prospective relief against [the defendant 
officials].'") (quoting Prisco, 851 F.2d at 96).  In the instant 
case, Giuffre's complaint clearly does not state a colorable 
claim for prospective equitable relief. 
 It is obvious to us that Giuffre's claim for rescission 
of the forfeiture of his property to the County is not viable. 
Giuffre's counsel admitted as much at oral argument when he 
acknowledged that Giuffre "would have a tough time rescinding" 
sale of the lots because "at least one [of the lots] is in the 
hands of a bonafide purchaser."  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
45-46.  Moreover, as the appellant officials point out, Giuffre 
has failed to name as defendants those individuals whom he claims 
conspired with the officials to acquire ownership of his building 
lots.  Even if the failure to name those individuals was not 
fatal to a claim of rescission, it is the County and not the 
officials that would be subject to the prospective relief sought 
by Giuffre.  Giuffre transferred title of the two building lots 
to the County, and the County sold the lots at public auction.   
 Hence, the individual officials could not rescind the 
sale, in any event, and would be liable only for compensatory and 
punitive damages.   Indeed, counsel conceded at oral argument 
that Giuffre is seeking only money damages in his action against 
the County and the officials.0  As such, the relief sought by 
                     
0At oral argument, the following exchange took place: 
 
THE COURT:  [A]m I correct in saying that what Mr. 
Guiffre wants is the money for the two lots? 
 
[COUNSEL FOR GIUFFRE]:  Essentially, there are some 
other minor damage components, but essentially, that's 
-- 
 
THE COURT:  They're all translatable into money? 
Giuffre is purely legal, and cannot be cast as prospective or 
equitable in character. 
 Because the actual remedy sought by Giuffre does not 
involve prospective, equitable relief, we hold that the rule of 
Prisco is inapplicable here.  Acierno,      F.3d      , 1994 WL 
318783 at * 9 (slip op. at 22) (holding that the lack of any 
viable available injunctive relief against defendant officer, as 
alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, entitled the defendant to 
immediate review of denial of summary judgment on immunity 
grounds).  Without immediate appellate review, the officials in 
the instant case would be effectively deprived of their immunity 
from suit -- their "right not to stand trial" -- on Giuffre's 
federal claims for damages, merely because Giuffre has included 
in his complaint what he himself concedes is a nonactionable 
claim. 
 To hold otherwise might encourage future plaintiffs to 
add frivolous equitable claims to their damage claims so as to 
defeat the immediate appeal of orders denying official immunity. 
See Schrob v. Catterson ("Schrob II"), 967 F.2d 929, 940-41 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (noting that other courts of appeal which have 
rejected Prisco have expressed such a concern); cf. Scott v. 
Lacy, 811 F.2d 1153, 1154 (7th Cir. 1992) ("plaintiffs who wished 
to harass officials to travail would need only demand equitable 
                                                                  
 
[COUNSEL FOR GIUFFRE]:  Correct. 
 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45. 
relief, defeating the defendants' opportunity to obtain prompt 
review"). 
 
B. 
 Giuffre argues, however, that we are without 
jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal because the district 
court denied immunity due to the existence of material disputes 
of fact.  Contrary to Giuffre's position, the immediate 
appealability of orders denying immunity is not automatically 
defeated merely because some issues of material fact remain. 
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1460 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Insofar 
as there may be issues of material fact present in a case on 
appeal, we would have to look at those facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.").  In a non-Prisco case such 
as this one, we have jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of 
law, whether the individual officials' alleged conduct violated 
any "clearly established" constitutional rights.  Mitchell, 472 
U.S. at 530; Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d at 1109. 
   Here, our task is somewhat complicated by the fact that 
the district court failed to make the threshold determination of 
whether the officials were entitled to immunity in the face of 
Giuffre's factual allegations.  The district court never 
determined, as it was obliged to do, "'whether the legal norms 
allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at 
the time of the challenged actions.'"  Brown v. Grabowski, 922 
F.2d at 1109 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1981)).  Indeed, the district court did not even identify the 
specific constitutional rights allegedly violated by the 
individual officials.  It merely concluded "that whether 
Defendants violated any clearly established laws constitutes a 
genuine issue of material fact."  Dist. Ct. Slip Op. at 8.  
 As part of our plenary review of a district court's 
immunity determination, we have jurisdiction to determine whether 
the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 
(1991); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).  That is because "'[a] necessary 
concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional 
right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the 
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the 
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at 
all.'"  D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Siegert v. 
Gilley, 500 U.S. at 232) (emphasis added in D.R. by L.R.).   
 Before us, Giuffre identifies the federal civil rights 
and constitutional claims against the individual officials in 
Counts 1, 2, and 3 of his complaint as sounding in the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  We have jurisdiction to 
consider the individual officials' assertion of entitlement to 
immunity to suit on those claims, but only to the extent that we 
can make that determination as a matter of law.0  See Burns, 971 
F.2d at 1019. 
                     
0To the extent that the complaint charges the official defendants 
with liability in their official capacity, we understand that the 
 As we have previously indicated, however, we are 
without jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment on 
the remaining claims raised by Giuffre against the County and the 
appellant officials.  Those remaining claims are not subject to 
immunity under the Mitchell doctrine, and thus cannot be reviewed 
on interlocutory appeal. 
 The denial of summary judgment on Giuffre's claims in 
Counts 4 and 5 of his complaint, seeking damages against 
Prosecutor Bissell and Chief Thornburg for failing to train and 
supervise subordinates in the Prosecutor's Office, is not 
immediately appealable.  That is because the County is the real 
party in interest with respect to these claims, and the County 
cannot assert a qualified immunity defense so as to qualify, 
under Mitchell, for review of the district court's summary 
judgment ruling.  Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d at 1105; see also 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 650 (1980) 
(holding that § 1983 does not accord municipal corporations a 
qualified immunity for their good-faith constitutional 
violations).   
 That portion of the interlocutory order of the district 
court denying the appellant officials immunity on Giuffre's 
pendent state claims, contained in Counts 6, 7, and 8 of 
Giuffre's complaint, also is unreviewable at this time.  As we 
explained in Brown v. Grabowski, decisions concerning immunity 
                                                                  
practical effect of that characterization is to charge the County 
with liability.  As discussed in text, the County, as the real 
party in interest, does not have a qualified immunity defense 
available to it. 
from suit on federal claims fall within the small class of 
appealable decisions -- carved out by the Supreme Court in Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)  -- that 
"'finally determine claims of right separable from, and 
collateral to, rights asserted in the action.'"  922 F.2d at 1106 
(quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-29).  The denial of a claim of 
qualified immunity premised upon state law, on the other hand, is 
appealable only if the state has conferred an underlying 
substantive immunity from suits arising from the performance of 
official duties.  922 F.2d at 1106-07.  Because the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act provides a government official with immunity from 
liability, not immunity from suits arising from the performance 
of official duties, we must dismiss for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction that portion of the officials' appeal which is based 
on immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  Id. at 1108-
09.  
  Accordingly, the scope of our jurisdiction for present 
purposes is limited to a review of the denial of absolute 
immunity for Prosecutor Bissell and the denial of qualified 
immunity for Bissell and the other individual officials on the 
claims against them for alleged violations of Giuffre's Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
 
III. 
 Because an understanding of the factual record is 
essential to our determination of whether we can, as a matter of 
law, decide the individual officials' entitlement to immunity on 
Giuffre's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, we 
detail the circumstances surrounding Giuffre's arrest and the 
forfeiture of his lots. 
 The record reveals that the Somerset County 
Prosecutor's Office obtained court authorization to wiretap 
Giuffre's telephone after a confidential informant identified 
Giuffre as a drug dealer.  Following the interception of numerous 
calls relating to illegal drug activities, and the 
contemporaneous surveillance of suspected drug transactions, a 
team of County investigators and police officers led by Sergeant 
Richard A. Meyers of the County Prosecutor's Office executed a 
search warrant for Giuffre's person and house on May 10, 1990. 
The authorized search of Giuffre's residence resulted in the 
seizure of approximately 17 grams of cocaine, 15 grams of 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and Giuffre's hunting gun and 
knife collections.  Also seized were financial records and 
documents, including deeds for the two building lots owned by 
Giuffre.  
 Following his arrest, Giuffre was transported to a 
satellite office of the County Prosecutor.  There, Giuffre was 
given his Miranda warnings and was questioned by Sergeant Meyers 
and Warren Township police detective Russell W. Leffert, who was 
working with the Prosecutor's Office in the investigation. 
Detective Samuel J. DeBella of the Prosecutor's Office also was 
present during this interrogation.  By all accounts, Giuffre 
indicated his willingness to cooperate with the investigators. 
According to Giuffre, however, he wanted to talk with his 
attorney, and his repeated requests to do so, he claims, were 
either ignored or denied by Sergeant Meyers and Detectives 
Leffert and DeBella. 
 Giuffre waived his right to have counsel present, he 
contends, only because he "was afraid that if I tried to push 
that right that harm would come to me."  App. 292.  Specifically, 
Giuffre alleges that during almost three hours of questioning, 
the officers "threatened that they were going to lock my 
girlfriend up, take her [handicapped] son away. . . . [i]f my 
dogs barked at them they were going to shoot the dogs," and that, 
if Giuffre did not cooperate, he would be put in jail "with a 
bunch of guys that believe I informed on them."  App. 289. 
Meyers, Leffert, and DeBella maintain that they never threatened 
Giuffre; that Giuffre never asked to speak with an attorney; and 
that Giuffre voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and gave a 
taped statement.  
 After giving the taped statement, Giuffre was processed 
on charges of possession of cocaine, possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  He was 
then transported to the Somerset County Jail, where on the orders 
of the Prosecutor's Office, Giuffre alleges, he was again denied 
any contact with his attorney.    
 On the following day, May 11, 1990, Giuffre was 
transported to the Somerset County Police Academy.  At his 
request, he met there with Robert A. Smith, the Prosecutor's 
deputy chief of detectives, and discussed the possibility of 
becoming a confidential informant.  Giuffre recalls Deputy Chief 
Smith initiating a conversation about Giuffre's assets. Giuffre's 
recollection is that he informed Smith that he had paid 
approximately $175,000 for the two Hunterdon County building 
lots, and that Smith suggested that, "You may be able to get out 
of this if you cooperate and you're willing to sign these lots 
over to the county."  App. 239.  
 Giuffre was then taken to see Richard Thornburg, the 
chief of detectives for the County Prosecutor's Office.  Chief 
Thornburg advised Giuffre that the County had the authority to 
seize his house, his car, and any personal belongings used in 
illegal drug transactions.  According to Giuffre's version of 
their conversation, Chief Thornburg made an offer:  if Giuffre 
turned over his two building lots and arranged "one good deal" as 
an informant, Giuffre's car and other personal items would be 
returned to him; he would be released on his own recognizance 
with no bail; he would not be indicted; the criminal charges 
would be dismissed, and therefore he would keep his professional 
insurance and builder's licenses.  App. 317-18.   
 Giuffre claims that Chief Thornburg gave him an hour to 
make up his mind, but forbad him from speaking first with his 
attorney.  Giuffre further alleges that Chief Thornburg 
threatened that, if Giuffre refused to cooperate, his home and 
the building lots would be forfeited; his fiancee would be put 
out of the house they shared and possibly face criminal charges 
herself; he would "rot in jail for a year" before going to trial, 
and he would lose his professional licenses.  App. 312.  
 At a second meeting with Chief Thornburg, also on May 
11, 1990, Giuffre signed over the deeds for the two lots for $1. 
Giuffre remembers being "floored" when he was asked at that 
meeting to sign a prepared statement attesting to the fact that 
he had bought the lots with illegal drug proceeds.  App. 329.  He 
insists that he made it clear to Chief Thornburg and Detective 
Leffert that "not one cent of illegal money [was] used to buy 
those lots."  Id.  Giuffre also alleges that he again demanded, 
and was again denied, his right to have a lawyer present. Giuffre 
nevertheless signed the statement averring that illegal drug 
proceeds were used to purchase the property.  App. 330-31.   
 Chief Thornburg and Deputy Chief Smith together offer a 
significantly different version of the circumstances surrounding 
the forfeiture of the building lots.  They deny having had any 
prior knowledge of the lots before Giuffre proposed substituting 
those lots in lieu of the forfeiture of his house and car.  They 
were amenable to Giuffre keeping his car and his house, they 
contend, only because that would facilitate Giuffre's 
effectiveness as an informant.  As Deputy Chief Smith explained 
in his deposition, their feeling was that Giuffre "needed the 
vehicle to cooperate with," and it was better for Giuffre "to do 
his dealings out of, his house, instead of going to a motel," 
because "[p]eople get nervous from motels."  App. 450.  Chief 
Thornburg maintains that Giuffre voluntarily acknowledged that 
the lots were purchased in part from the proceeds of illegal drug 
distribution, and that he never made any promises that Giuffre 
would not be prosecuted if he cooperated and turned over the 
building lots.  Thornburg denies that Giuffre ever requested an 
attorney at any time during their discussions.   He also denies 
ever threatening harm to Giuffre, Giuffre's fiancee, or Giuffre's 
dogs.   
 Prosecutor Bissell apparently had no direct contact 
with Giuffre on May 11, 1990.  He did, however, direct Chief 
Thornburg to ask Giuffre certain questions during the 
negotiations which resulted in the forfeiture of Giuffre's 
building lots.  Bissell wanted to know which individuals Giuffre 
could identify as possible targets of an official investigation, 
and also "whether or not the lots had somehow been involved in 
the drugs, in the money, did any of the money from the drugs, was 
that used to purchase the lots?"  App. 362-65.  Bissell testified 
at his deposition that he was assured by Chief Thornburg that 
"some or all of the money used [to purchase] the lots was -- came 
from drugs."  Id.   Although initially inclined against entering 
into any kind of agreement with Giuffre, Bissell says he later 
"acquiesced against [his] better judgment" at the urging of Chief 
Thornburg, who felt "that Giuffre was someone who could provide 
valuable information."  App. 361.   
  After Giuffre signed over the deeds for the building 
lots, he was released on his own recognizance.  Two days later, 
Giuffre told attorney Richard Gordeck, a childhood acquaintance, 
about the forfeiture of the lots.  He also told Grodeck that the 
Prosecutor's Office had promised to dismiss the criminal charges 
if he cooperated as a confidential informant and produced one 
defendant of substance, but that he was warned against discussing 
the matter with an attorney.   
 Grodeck subsequently met with Chief Thornburg and 
Assistant Somerset County Prosecutor James R. Wronko, and 
attempted to "reconstruct the deal because Giuffre wanted the 
lots back."  App. 417.  Chief Thornburg states that he told 
Grodeck that the County was "willing to give the lots back" and 
to "start from scratch," meaning that Giuffre would be prosecuted 
on the criminal charges.  App. 417.  However, Grodeck does not 
recall Thornburg saying that the deal could be rescinded.  In any 
event, at the meeting Grodeck focused on having the agreement 
with Giuffre put in writing, rather than pressing for a return of 
the lots, because Giuffre's ultimate goal was a dismissal of the 
criminal charges.  The transaction with Giuffre was never 
formally memorialized, however, because the County Prosecutor's 
Office had a policy of not putting confidential informant 
agreements in writing. 
 Immediately thereafter, Giuffre alleges that Chief 
Thornburg and Assistant Prosecutor Wronko told him to get rid of 
his lawyer "or the deal is off."  App. 1122.  Giuffre complied 
and, on June 1, 1990, he appeared without counsel before the 
Somerset County Superior Court for an initial hearing on the drug 
charges.  The court postponed the hearing and gave Giuffre a week 
to hire a new attorney.  Giuffre claims that members of the 
County Prosecutor's Office then arranged for him to be 
represented by a public defender, notwithstanding his 
protestations that he did not qualify as an indigent because he 
owned assets.  Chief Thornburg, Assistant Prosecutor Wronko, and 
Detective DeBella each deny any involvement in Giuffre's decision 
to discharge his privately-retained counsel and his application 
for representation by a public defender.  Giuffre, in any event, 
never appeared again in court to answer the drug charges against 
him.   
 Following his arrest, Giuffre began cooperating with 
County investigators, meeting regularly with Detective DeBella 
and others from the Prosecutor's office.0  Giuffre alleges that 
during this time, in July 1990, Prosecutor Bissell indicated to 
him that he would have the first opportunity to buy back his 
building lots, but his offer of $100,000 cash for the lots was 
later rejected by Bissell as insufficient.  Giuffre further 
alleges that he was also told, by Detective DeBella, that the 
County had a policy of targeting individuals with substantial 
amounts of cash and/or assets.  App. 335-37.  Detective DeBella 
admitted in his deposition testimony that, in fact, he had told 
Giuffre that "we don't want people just for the drugs, we have to 
                     
0While working with the County Prosecutor's Office, Giuffre 
surreptitiously taped his conversations with investigators. Those 
tapes were turned over to his public defender, who in turn sent 
them to the New Jersey Attorney General's Office.  A subsequent 
investigation by the Attorney General's office into Giuffre's 
allegations of official misconduct by Prosecutor Bissell, members 
of the County Prosecutor's office, and others, was closed without 
further action after state authorities failed to uncover any 
evidence corroborating Giuffre's allegations. App. 979.  All 
relevant documents were thereafter forwarded by the New Jersey 
Attorney General's Office to the United States Attorney's Office 
for New Jersey, which also conducted an inquiry into the same 
allegations raised by Giuffre.  Id.  
  
get people with assets." App. 526-29.  DeBella, however, denied 
any knowledge of a County policy of targeting individuals with 
substantial assets, explaining that his remarks to Giuffre meant 
only that "if you take away [a drug dealer's] money, then he 
can't buy drugs, he can't distribute drugs." App. 528-29.   
 On October 31, 1991, Giuffre was granted an 
administrative dismissal of the outstanding criminal charges, 
ostensibly because Giuffre's cooperation had led to the 
prosecution of four other criminal defendants for drug-related 
offenses.  In the meantime, the County had authorized the sale of 
Giuffre's two forfeited lots at a public sale, notice of which 
was published.  Each lot sold for $10,000. 
 
IV. 
 In considering the merits of the officials' appeal of 
the district court's order denying immunity, we first address the 
question of whether Prosecutor Bissell was entitled to absolute 
immunity.  Our review of this legal issue is plenary, and we must 
view the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence in the light most favorable to Giuffre.  Kulwicki, 969 
F.2d at 1461.   
 The district court determined that Prosecutor Bissell 
was not entitled to absolute immunity "to the extent that [his] 
actions can be characterized as investigative functions."  Dist. 
Ct. Slip Op. at 8.  Bissell challenges that determination, 
claiming that he was completely uninvolved with the investigative 
procedures leading up to consummation of the property forfeiture 
deal with Giuffre, and that his conduct "constituted a core 
prosecutorial function; i.e., the evaluation of information in 
furtherance of deciding the appropriate course of criminal 
prosecution."  County rpl.br. at 10. 
 In Kulwicki, we set forth the law concerning the 
immunity of prosecutors from suit under § 1983: 
 Prosecutors are subject to varying levels of 
official immunity.  Absolute immunity attaches to all 
actions performed in a "quasi-judicial" role.  Imber v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994-95, 47 
L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).  This includes activity taken while 
in court, such as the presentation of evidence or legal 
argument, as well as selected out-of-court behavior 
"intimately associated with the judicial phases" of 
litigation.  See id.; Fry [v. Melaragno], 939 F.2d 
[832, 838 (9th Cir. 1991)] (activity occurring as part 
of presentation of evidence is absolutely protected). 
By contrast, a prosecutor acting in an investigative or 
administrative capacity is protected only by qualified 
immunity.  Imber, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-
96; Burns v. Reed, [500 U.S. 478], 111 S. Ct. 1934, 
1938 n.2, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991).   In addition, there 
may be instances where a prosecutor's behavior falls 
completely outside the prosecutorial role.  See Rose v. 
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 1989).  In that 
case, no absolute immunity is available. 
 
 In determining whether absolute immunity is 
available for particular actions, the courts engage in 
a "functional" analysis of each alleged activity.  See 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811, 102 S.Ct. 
2727, 2734, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Rose, 871 F.2d at 
343.  Three factors determine whether a government 
official should be given absolute immunity for a 
particular function:  1) whether there is "a historical 
or common law basis for the immunity in question;" 2) 
whether performance of the function poses a risk of 
harassment or vexatious litigation against the 
official; and 3) whether there exist alternatives to 
damage suits against the official as means of 
redressing wrongful conduct.  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 
521-22, 105 S.Ct. at 2812.  See Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 
1938; Fry, 939 F.2d at 836 n.6. 
 
 Where absolute immunity does not apply, qualified 
immunity protects official action, if the officer's 
behavior was "objectively reasonable" in light of the 
constitutional rights affected.  [Brown v.] Grabowski, 
922 F.2d at 1109; Schrob [v. Catterson "Schrob I"], 948 
F.2d [1402, 1421 (3d Cir. 1991)].  Objective 
reasonableness is measured by the amount of knowledge 
available to the officer at the time of the alleged 
violation.  See Grabowski, 922 F.2d at 111. 
 
 The decision to initiate a prosecution is at the 
core of a prosecutor's judicial role.  Imber, 424 U.S. 
at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-96.  See Rose, 871 F.2d at 
343.  A prosecutor is absolutely immune when making 
this decision, even when he acts without a good faith 
belief that any wrong-doing has occurred.  See Rose, 
871 F.2d at 347 n. 12; Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 
549, 557 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 
107 S.Ct. 1910, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987).  Harm to a 
falsely-charged defendant is remedied by safeguards 
built into the judicial system--probable cause 
hearings, dismissal of the charges--and into the state 
codes of responsibility.  Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1939, 
1942. 
 
969 F.2d at 1463-64.           
 More recently, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993), reaffirmed the principle 
that "[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and those 
investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's 
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial 
proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity," although 
those duties and functions may be protected by qualified 
immunity.  Id. at 2615.  The Court reasoned that, "[w]hen a 
prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally 
performed by a detective or police officer, it is 'neither 
appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity 
should protect the one and not the other.'"  Id. at 2616.  The 
Court also held that the official seeking absolute immunity bears 
the burden of showing it is justified for the function in 
question.  Id. at 2613.  Based on that reasoning, the Court in 
Buckley held that a prosecutor, who was sued in a § 1983 action 
by a released murder suspect, was not entitled to absolute 
immunity because he was not acting as an advocate for the State 
when he allegedly fabricated evidence against the murder suspect 
and made false statements to the press about that evidence.  The 
Buckley prosecutor thus had to seek protection under the 
qualified immunity doctrine.  Id. at 2617-18. 
 With these principles in mind, we examine the 
allegations  against Prosecutor Bissell to determine whether his 
alleged conduct is absolutely immune from liability.  As we have 
already discussed, Giuffre's complaint charges Bissell with 
conspiring with others to deprive him both of his right to 
counsel and of his property rights without due process of law. 
Giuffre alleges that, as part of that conspiracy, Bissell 
rejected as inadequate Giuffre's offer to buy his lots back for 
$100,000, although the two lots were ultimately sold for a total 
of $20,000 at the public sale and subsequently transferred to two 
individuals with alleged ties to the Prosecutor's Office.   
 The record discloses that:  Bissell engaged in a series 
of discussions with Chief Thornburg during the forfeiture 
discussions with Giuffre on May 11, 1990; he directed Thornburg 
to question Giuffre about suspected drug dealers and as to 
whether the lots had been purchased with illegal drug proceeds; 
he approved the transaction whereby Giuffre forfeited his 
property to the County and cooperated in an ongoing 
investigation, and he also, ultimately, approved the 
administrative dismissal of the drug charges against Giuffre. The 
evidence further shows that the lots were sold on the 
recommendation of Bissell, who never had the property valued by a 
licensed appraiser.   
 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to 
Giuffre, we cannot hold that Bissell is entitled to absolute 
prosecutorial immunity for his role in the sale of Giuffre's 
forfeited property by the County.  Bissell's actions in the 
allegedly improper sale of the property seized by the government 
clearly involved administrative duties, for which he is not 
entitled to absolute immunity.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S.Ct. 
at 2615; Schrob I, 948 F.2d at 1419.  
 Nor do we believe that Bissell has satisfied his burden 
of demonstrating that absolute immunity shields him from any 
liability for his allegedly improper conduct in the negotiated 
transaction with Giuffre.  Bissell's alleged conduct cannot 
properly be characterized as "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in 
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for 
trial," which are therefore entitled to the protection of 
absolute immunity.  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S.Ct. at 
2615.  The approval and authorization of a transaction whereby 
Giuffre escaped prosecution for serious drug offenses does not 
constitute the initiation of a prosecution, for which judicial 
safeguards exist to protect the defendant.  To the contrary, the 
very essence of the transaction with Giuffre was the avoidance of 
prosecution.  Indeed, Bissell concedes that the negotiations with 
Giuffre for his cooperation were focused on a dismissal of the 
charges, and not on a guilty plea.  
 Significantly, Bissell points us to no analogous 
historical or common-law basis for an absolute immunity for 
prosecutors who advise investigators on how to proceed with the 
type of informal transaction here, whereby an arrestee in an 
"air-tight" drug case is given his freedom in exchange for 
cooperation and property.0  See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 521 
("First, in deciding whether officials performing a particular 
function are entitled to absolute immunity, we have generally 
looked for a historical or common-law basis for the immunity in 
question.").  We reach this conclusion because, contrary to 
Bissell's position, we do not view his approval of the 
transaction with Giuffre as analogous to an in rem civil 
forfeiture.   
 In Schrob I, we held that a prosecutor's initiation of 
an in rem civil proceeding for the forfeiture of criminal 
property was absolutely immune because it was "intimately 
connected with the criminal process," and because an owner of the 
property would have sufficient opportunity to challenge the 
legality of the proceeding.  948 F.2d at 1411-12.  Here, the 
transaction with Giuffre was never memorialized in writing, in 
accordance with the policy of Bissell's office, and was thereby 
designed to remain beyond judicial oversight.  Consequently, 
                     
0See supra note 2. 
while the ultimate result of the agreement with Giuffre may have 
been the forfeiture of his property, we are not presented here 
with an in rem proceeding and its attendant safeguards.   
 Rather, we view Prosecutor Bissell's act of advising 
Chief Thornburg during the challenged forfeiture negotiations as 
the functional equivalent of a prosecutor providing legal advice 
to police during the investigative stages of a criminal 
proceeding, an act which is not absolutely immunized from 
liability.  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 496.  In Burns v. Reed, 
the Supreme Court determined that there was no historical or 
common-law support for extending absolute immunity to a 
prosecutor's act of counseling police that hypnosis was an 
acceptable investigative technique in questioning a mother 
suspected of attempting to kill her two sons.  While we are 
cognizant of the factual distinctions between the instant case, 
where Giuffre was under arrest by the Prosecutor's Office, and 
Burns v. Reed, where police were questioning an unarrested 
suspect, we believe that the rationale of the Court in that case 
applies with equal force here. 
 Burns v. Reed rejected any notion that giving legal 
advice to investigators is related to a prosecutor's role in 
screening cases for prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness 
of the criminal judicial process.  The Court reasoned that: 
Indeed, it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be 
absolutely immune from liability for giving advice to 
the police, but to allow police officers only qualified 
immunity for following the advice. . . . Almost any 
action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct 
participation in purely investigative activity, could 
be said to be in some way related to the ultimate 
decision whether to prosecute, but we have never 
indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. 
 
Id. at 495.  That reasoning, which we believe applicable here, 
was reaffirmed by the Court in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2617 ("When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are 
the same, as they were here, the immunity that protects them is 
the same."). 
 Bissell also has failed to demonstrate a risk of 
vexatious litigation that would not be alleviated by the norm of 
qualified immunity.  See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 494 
("Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from 
the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation."); 
see also Mitchell, 521 U.S. at 511 (noting the "obvious risks of 
entanglement in vexatious litigation" that arise from "the 
judicial or 'quasi-judicial' tasks that have been the primary 
wellsprings of absolute immunity").  Nor has Bissell presented us 
with any alternative means apart from the instant action for 
redressing the wrongful conduct alleged here by Giuffre.  See 
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522 ("[M]ost of the officials who are 
entitled to absolute immunity from liability are subject to other 
checks to help to prevent abuses of authority from going 
unredressed."). 
 Because Giuffre was never formally charged with any 
crime, he cannot seek redress through the criminal process for 
the wrongful conduct he attributes to Prosecutor Bissell.  Nor, 
as we have just discussed, are there any safeguards of the 
judicial process -- apart from the instant action -- to serve as 
a restraint on the type of prosecutorial misconduct alleged by 
Giuffre.  See  Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 492 ("'[T]he safeguards 
built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for 
private damages actions as a means of controlling 
unconstitutional conduct.'") (citation omitted); Mitchell, 472 
U.S. at 522-23 ("[T]he judicial process is largely self-
correcting:  procedural rules, appeals, and the possibility of 
collateral challenges obviate the need for damages actions to 
prevent unjust results."). 
  Prosecutor Bissell thus has failed to carry his burden 
of establishing that he was functioning as an "advocate" when he 
directed Chief Thornburg to question Giuffre concerning his 
future cooperation with investigators, or when he counseled 
Thornburg to ensure that illegal proceeds had been used in the 
purchase of Giuffre's building lots, all for the alleged purpose 
of acquiring property and allowing Giuffre to avoid the judicial 
process entirely.  Those actions "have no functional tie to the 
judicial process," and are not entitled to absolute immunity 
merely because they were actions undertaken by a prosecutor.  See 
Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2618.    
 We hold, therefore, that Prosecutor Bissell is not 
entitled to absolute immunity, and that he is, at most, entitled 
to qualified immunity for his actions.  Our decision is informed 
by the teaching of the Supreme Court that we must be "'quite 
sparing'" in recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity.  Id. at 
2613 (citation omitted). 
   
V. 
 The denial of qualified immunity is an issue of law, 
also subject to our plenary review.   As the Supreme Court has 
counseled: 
 
Decision of this purely legal question permits courts 
expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test 
without requiring a defendant who rightly claims 
qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time 
consuming preparation to defend the suits on its 
merits.  One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or 
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted 
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed 
upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit. 
 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. at 232. 
 In determining whether a government official is 
entitled to qualified immunity, we must apply the two-part, 
objective test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982): 
government officials performing discretionary 
functions, generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known. 
 
Id.; see Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 201; Burns v. County of Cambria, 
971 F.2d at 1021.  The "clearly established" standard of Harlow 
was delineated by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 640 (1987): 
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what 
he is doing violates that right.  This is not to say 
that an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has 
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in 
the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent. 
 Id.    
 This inquiry requires a threshold determination of 
whether the constitutional rights asserted by the plaintiff were 
"clearly established" at the time the defendant officials acted, 
and whether the plaintiff "has asserted a violation of a 
constitutional right at all.'"  Acierno,     F.3d    , 1994 WL 
318783 at * 7 (slip op. at 17) (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 
232).  As we discussed above in deciding the jurisdictional 
issues, the district court never determined whether Giuffre 
asserted a violation of a constitutional right, let alone a 
"clearly established" right.  The court's entire discussion of 
qualified immunity was: 
 Finally, the individual Defendants argue that they 
are entitled to qualified immunity.  In Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that the test for qualified immunity is 
based on objective reasonableness -- "whether a 
reasonable officer could have believed [the challenged 
action] to be lawful, in light of clearly established 
law and the information the [] officers possessed." Id. 
at 641.  Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Leffert, 
Meyers, and DeBella repeatedly denied him the right to 
counsel, and that Defendants Smith, Thornburg, and 
Bissell also denied him counsel and unlawfully took his 
property without due process of law.  The Court finds 
that whether Defendant violated any clearly established 
laws constitutes a genuine issue of material fact. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 8.   
  In reviewing the district court's order denying 
qualified immunity, we thus must determine whether "'reasonable 
officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could 
have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that 
their conduct would be unlawful.'"  Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 202 
(quoting Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and 
Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir 1989)).   Where appropriate, 
we may consider whether the constitutional rights asserted by 
Giuffre were "clearly established" at the time the individual 
officials acted, without initially deciding whether a 
constitutional violation was alleged at all.  See Acierno,    
F.3d    , 1994 WL at * 23 n.7 (slip op. at 17 n.7); Rappa v. New 
Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1077-79 (3d Cir. 1994); Abdul-Akbar 
v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 201-05 (3d Cir. 1993).  As we stated in 
Good, "[t]he ultimate issue is whether, despite the absence of a 
case applying established principles to the same facts, 
reasonable officers in the defendants' position at the relevant 
time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided 
case law, that their conduct was lawful."  891 F.2d at 1092.  We 
note that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."  Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Schrob I, 948 F.2d at 1421. 
A. 
 Giuffre alleges that his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel was violated when he gave a taped statement to Sergeant 
Meyers and Detectives Leffert and DeBella during the custodial 
interrogation following his arrest on May 10, 1990.  We disagree.  
 Giuffre concedes, as he must, that violations of the 
prophylactic Miranda procedures do not amount to violations of 
the Constitution itself.  Giuffre br. at 26; see, e.g., Warren v. 
City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (holding that 
"the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from 
evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 
action"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Bennett v. Passic, 
545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) ("No rational argument can 
be made in support of the notion that the failure to give Miranda 
warnings subjects a police officer to liability under the Civil 
Rights Act").  The right protected under the Fifth Amendment is 
the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself in 
a criminal prosecution, whereas the "right to counsel" during 
custodial interrogation recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), is merely a procedural safeguard, and not a 
substantive right.  Id. 
 Giuffre contends, however, that the alleged conduct of 
Sergeant Meyers and Detectives Leffert and DeBella reached beyond 
Miranda and touched upon his substantive Fifth Amendment rights. 
His argument is that, although he was advised of, and waived, his 
Miranda rights, "Mirandizing was a farce" because the individual 
officers never intended to allow him to exercise his right to 
remain silent.  Giuffre br. at 30.  Relying exclusively on the 
Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 
1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992), Giuffre 
asserts that the Fifth Amendment violation alleged here sustains 
his § 1983 action against the individual officials. 
 Giuffre's reliance on Cooper is misplaced.  The 
majority in Cooper broke new ground when it held, in 1992, that a 
§ 1983 claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination clause was stated by allegations that the 
plaintiff's statements were compelled, even though those 
statements were never used against the plaintiff in a court of 
law.  963 F.2d at 1242-43.  The dissenting judges in Cooper 
presented a persuasive argument that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self incrimination is not violated until 
evidence is admitted in a criminal case.  See 963 F.2d at 1253-55 
(Brunetti, J., dissenting); id. at 1256-57 (Leavy, J., 
dissenting).  This disagreement, and subsequent opinions of other 
courts of appeal, indicate to us that the law on which Giuffre 
relies is not clearly established at this time.  Wiley v. Doory, 
14 F.3d 993, 997-98 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that "law not 
clearly established even at time of the Cooper decision" and 
"remains unsettled" today); see also Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 
1054, 1062 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to decide whether view of 
en banc Ninth Circuit in Cooper "is sound").  If the law on which 
Giuffre pins his claims is not presently clear, it could not have 
been clearly established in 1990 when Giuffre's Fifth Amendment 
violations were alleged to have occurred.   
 Furthermore, Cooper was decided under a highly-unusual 
set of facts.  The defendant law enforcement officers there 
admitted that they engaged in a pre-existing interrogation plan 
whereby they ignored the suspect's repeated requests to speak 
with an attorney, deliberately infringed on his right to remain 
silent, and relentlessly interrogated him in an attempt to 
extract a confession.  963 F.2d at 1223-32.  In contrast, Giuffre 
has not alleged, nor have any of the appellant officials 
admitted, the application of a pre-existing plan to interrogate 
him in such a manner as to touch upon his substantive Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
 In light of the law as it existed at the time of the 
alleged Fifth Amendment violation, and as it exists today, we 
cannot say that a reasonable officer would have known that the 
conduct alleged here violated Giuffre's substantive rights under 
the Fifth Amendment, even though the officer might have 
recognized that the conduct could have been the basis for the 
suppression of Giuffre's statement.  Because the substantive 
Fifth Amendment norms allegedly violated by the individual 
officials were not clearly established at the time of the 
challenged actions, Giuffre's claims based on violation of his 
Fifth Amendment right must fail.  Accordingly, Sergeant Meyers 
and Detectives Leffert and DeBella are entitled to qualified 
immunity on Giuffre's Fifth Amendment claims. 
 
B. 
 Prosecutor Bissell, Chief Thornburg, and Deputy Chief 
Smith also are entitled to partial summary judgment on Giuffre's 
claims that their denial of his right to counsel during the May 
11, 1990 negotiations violated his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Giuffre's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not 
attached at the time of the challenged actions of Bissell, 
Thornburg, and Smith.   
 It is settled law that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until the "initiation of adversary 
judicial proceedings," Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 
(1986), by way of any formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.  Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972).  Giuffre was never formally charged with the drug 
offenses, and his only appearance in court resulted in a 
postponement to allow him time to retain counsel.  
 We do not believe, as Giuffre urges, that his informal 
transaction with the Prosecutor's Office can properly be 
analogized to the formality of the plea bargaining process in 
which the result is ultimately submitted to the court.  Compare 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (vacating 
judgment of conviction and sentencing of defendant whose formal 
plea agreement was not honored by prosecutor).   Furthermore, we 
have held that the remedy for the failure to provide an accused 
with the benefit of counsel during plea bargaining is withdrawal 
of the guilty plea without inquiry into whether demonstrable harm 
resulted.  Gallarelli v. United States, 441 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d 
Cir. 1971) ("[T]he guidance of counsel is so essential a 
protection for an accused during plea bargaining and in the 
making of a decision to plead guilty that a plea entered without 
such guidance must be set aside."). 
 We therefore are not persuaded by Giuffre's argument 
that his transaction with the appellant officials was a plea 
bargain agreement.  It is true that in rem proceedings for the 
forfeiture of criminal property are "intimately connected with 
the criminal process," Schrob I, 948 F.2d at 1411-12, and that a 
defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel during plea 
negotiations.  See Gallarelli, 441 F.2d at 1405.  Those 
principles, however, do not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation 
in the instant case.  That is because, as the officials contend, 
these negotiations were not focused on a guilty plea, but rather 
on a dismissal of the charges and a forfeiture of Giuffre's 
building lots.   
 Since Giuffre was never formally charged, never 
indicted or arraigned, never appeared at a preliminary hearing, 
and never entered a guilty plea, his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel never attached.  Giuffre therefore had no "clearly 
established" right that could have been violated by the actions 
of the individual officials under the Sixth Amendment.  That 
being so, reasonable officials in the situation alleged here 
could not have known that their actions violated Giuffre's 
"clearly established" Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Accordingly,  Bissell, Thornburg, and Smith are entitled to 
qualified immunity with respect to Giuffre's claims premised on a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
C. 
 Giuffre also alleges violations of his rights to 
substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
 We may readily dispose of Giuffre's procedural due 
process claim because Giuffre has failed to allege a violation of 
clearly established federal law.  His argument is predicated on 
an alleged violation of the procedures established under New 
Jersey law governing civil forfeiture.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1, et 
seq.0  Violations of state law, however, are insufficient to 
state a claim under § 1983.  Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1468.  To the 
extent that Giuffre claims his procedural due process rights were 
violated in the forfeiture negotiations, he has failed to allege 
any violation of the United States Constitution.  We thus hold 
that Prosecutor Bissell, Chief Thornburg, and Deputy Chief Smith 
are entitled to qualified immunity as to any claim asserted by 
Giuffre that alleges a violation of procedural due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 With respect to Giuffre's substantive due process 
claim, the individual officials argue that there could have been 
no Fourteenth Amendment violation because they had the right to 
entertain an agreement whereby Giuffre forfeited the building 
lots in exchange for a dismissal of the criminal charges.  We 
disagree.  We believe that the conduct of the individual 
officials alleged by Giuffre is sufficiently conscience-shocking 
as to state a legally cognizable claim for a violation of 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc) 
("[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause can only 
be violated by governmental employees when their conduct amounts 
to an abuse of official power that 'shocks the conscience.'"); 
see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 112 S. Ct. 
1061, 1069 (1992) (reaffirming "shock[s] the conscience" standard 
                     
0See supra note 1. 
in civil damage actions for violations of substantive due 
process); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause "serves to 
prevent governmental power from being 'used for purposes of 
oppression'") (citation omitted). 
 The individual officials' arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive.  They argue that, pursuant to application of the 
"relation-back doctrine," title to Giuffre's property vested with 
the State prior to any contact between them and Giuffre, and that 
they therefore cannot under any circumstances be deemed 
unlawfully to have deprived Giuffre of his property.  However, 
the common law "relation back" doctrine, which is a fictional and 
retroactive vesting of title, is not self-executing; rather, it 
takes effect only upon the entry of a judicial order of 
forfeiture or condemnation.  United States v. A Parcel of Land, 
Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements, 113 S.Ct. 1126, 1135 (1993) 
(Opinion of Stevens, J.), affirming 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991). 
That doctrine is intended to protect the property rights of 
innocent purchasers of forfeited land, see 937 F.2d at 102-103; 
it does not shield public officials from any possible liability 
for a coercive and fraudulent forfeiture of property such as 
Giuffre alleges here. 
   The individual officials further contend that their 
conduct, even if unlawful, could not have deprived Giuffre of his 
property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because their 
actions had "no legal effect upon the forfeiture of [Giuffre's] 
property."  County br. at 35.  That argument merely begs the 
question of whether or not the property legally vested in the 
County in the first place.  We believe that the actions of the 
individual officials certainly would have had a "legal effect" on 
the forfeiture if, as Giuffre alleges, the subject lots were not 
purchased with illegal drug proceeds, and the officials, knowing 
that to be so, coerced Giuffre into making a false statement to 
facilitate forfeiture of the lots pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et 
seq.  Without any independent, untainted evidence of record that 
illegal drug proceeds were, in fact, used to purchase the lots, 
the voluntariness of Giuffre's written statement to that effect 
is of paramount importance in deciding whether Giuffre was 
deprived of his property without due process of law.  We cannot 
determine that factual question in this interlocutory appeal. 
 The individual officials, in any event, do not appear 
to challenge the principle that a showing of coercive conduct 
through threats and intimidation in order to induce a suspect to 
make a statement would constitute a violation of Giuffre's right 
of substantive due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Rather, the essence of their argument is that they 
did not do what Giuffre alleges they did.  Their "I didn't do it" 
defense to Giuffre's substantive Fourteenth Amendment claim is 
not cognizable as a declaration of qualified immunity.  Burns v. 
County of Cambria, 971 F.2d at 1019.  As Judge Easterbrook 
reasoned in Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992):  "[T]here is no separate 
'right not to be tried' on the question whether the defendants 
did the deeds alleged; that is precisely the question for trial. 
. . . It is impossible to know which 'clearly established' rules 
of law to consult unless you know what is going on."  Id. at 341. 
 Hence, we have no jurisdiction to determine whether the 
district court properly denied the summary judgment motion of the 
individual officials on any of Giuffre's claim predicated on 
violations of his substantive right of due process of law under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 
at 1019 (declining to exercise jurisdiction over appeals of 
defendant officials who had rested their case on the mere denial 
that the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs had occurred); Ryan v. 
Burlington County, N.J., 860 F.2d 1199, 1203 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that court will not exercise jurisdiction where "I didn't 
do it" defense merely refutes plaintiff's case-in-chief), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989); see also Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 201 
(noting that the question of qualified immunity often cannot be 
resolved adequately until dispositive facts have been presented 
at trial and reduced to findings).   
 Because genuine issues of material fact remain 
concerning  alleged violations of Giuffre's right of substantive 
due process, requiring development of a factual record at trial, 
we may not entertain the officials' appeal of the district 
court's order as it relates to the denial of immunity for the 
substantive claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.   
V. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the 
district court's July 29, 1993 order denying Prosecutor Bissell 
absolute immunity.  However, we will reverse the July 29, 1993 
order of the district court to the extent that it denies the 
individual officials qualified immunity from suit on any of 
Giuffre's claims alleging violations of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments and violations of procedural due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  We will remand that portion of the 
district court's order with the direction that the district court 
enter partial summary judgment for the individual officials on 
only those claims.  We dismiss the remainder of the appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction, and remand to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. 
